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Recent Developments in Nontraditional Alternatives
in Juvenile Justice
Honorable Barbara Gilleran Johnson* & Daniel Rosman"
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years, juvenile crime in the United States has
increased at an alarming rate.' Policymakers concerned with the rapid
increase in juvenile crime currently find themselves at a familiar
crossroads. The national mood demands a rigid posture toward
juvenile offenders.2 At the same time, those concerned with the future
of delinquent children realize that some form of rehabilitative action is
necessary to address underlying problems.3 As communities struggle
* Associate Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Waukegan,
Illinois, 1987; B.A., DePaul University, 1974; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1978. Judge Gilleran Johnson worked as an Assistant Attorney General and an Assistant
State's Attorney, specializing in juvenile law and crimes against minors. She also
helped establish the first Child Protection Team in Lake County and was appointed to
the Governor's Citizen's Committee for Abused Children. The Illinois Supreme Court
appointed Judge Gilleran Johnson on three occasions to the Illinois Judicial Conference
concerning juvenile law, where she held the positions of chairperson and vice-
chairperson. Judge Gilleran Johnson also teaches classes in the areas of Criminal
Justice and Juvenile Law.
* * Staff Attorney, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Lake County, Waukegan,
Illinois, B.S. University of Illinois, 1987, J.D. DePaul University, 1991. Mr. Rosman
has previously worked as a Staff Attorney for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kane
County and in private practice. Mr. Rosman is admitted to practice in Illinois.
I. Richard Lacayo, When Kids Go Bad, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 60 (recognizing the
significant increase in juvenile crime in the United States during the past six years). In
1994 there were 1403 juvenile offenders detained in Illinois' jails. SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 532
(1994) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
2. See George E. Furtado, Juvenile Hearing Boards: Communities Respond to
Juvenile Crime, R.I. BAR J., May, 1996, at 17 (stating that "[l1ong gone are the days of
compassion for youthful transgressors-it is now more like a Clint Eastwood spaghetti
western: shoot first and ask questions later"); see also SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI &
EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING JUVENILE JUSTICE 101 (1996) (describing the juvenile
courts as becoming "more offense-oriented and less offender-oriented").
3. See Furtado, supra note 2, at 17. Mr. Furtado states that "what we need are bold
strikes against the forces that turn young human beings into violent criminals. At the
very least, we need community-based assistance to receptive youths." Id. See also
THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 166 (1992) (noting that there are
essentially three ideas which form the driving force behind juvenile justice policy: (1)
juvenile crime is at an exceptionally high level; (2) the present juvenile justice policies
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with these conflicting attitudes, there is a growing understanding that
derelict behavior is best addressed with family and community
involvement.4
Over the past several years, an increasing number of community-
based programs have been initiated throughout the United States to
deter or rectify delinquent behavior.5 Similarly, several Illinois
communities have implemented policies consistent with this national
trend.6 This Article will review some of these recent trends and
explore their potential benefits and pitfalls.
First, this Article will provide a brief background on the history of
juvenile justice policy in the United States.7 This Article will then
discuss teen court programs that many communities have initiated in
response to recent surges in juvenile crime.8 Specifically, this Article
will discuss the process through which these programs allow a teen
peer jury to review and punish juvenile defendants for their actions.9
In addition, this Article will discuss the social policies and legal
philosophies which have underscored the development of teen court as
a juvenile justice mechanism,'0 and it will examine the statutory basis
for teen court in Illinois, important practical aspects of the program,
and the expected benefits such programs can provide." Next, this
Article will discuss how local communities are placing greater
responsibility with parents through the use of parental responsibility
make the problem worse; and (3) changing those policies will reduce juvenile crime).
See also Carol Sternhell, If Johnny Breaks the Law Should Mommy Go to Jail?, 222
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, No. 3, Mar. 1, 1996, at 69 (stating that "over the long term
juvenile crime rates have remained flat," but acknowledging that children between the
ages of 10 and 17 are currently committing a higher percentage of all violent crimes
than in 1990).
4. Hon. Larry W. Moran, Involving Montana's Youth in the Justice System: A View
from the Bench, MONT. LAW., June, 1996, at 7. Judge Moran writes:
History indicates that in a democracy a law will be effective only so long as it
is accepted by the majority; otherwise it will be ignored or changed. Laws
affecting juveniles are no exception. The message is obvious: An effective
juvenile justice system which promotes the voluntary acceptance of the rule of
law requires that the thoughts, ideas and recommendations of juveniles be part
of the process.
Id.
5. See infra Parts IIl-V on teen court programs, parental responsibility ordinances,
and juvenile curfew legislation.
6. See infra note 29 and accompanying text; see also notes 116-19 (discussing a
local Illinois parental responsibility statute).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Parts III.C-D.
10. See infra Part Ill.
I 1. See infra Part Ill.
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ordinances, which impose vicarious liability upon parents for the
actions of their children. 2 This Article will enumerate and review the
legal obstacles and challenges to the implementation of such
ordinances, concluding that parental responsibility laws may be
particularly vulnerable to constitutional attack. 3 Finally, this Article
will discuss the recent proliferation of curfew regulations as a means
of addressing after-hours delinquency. 4 The Article will focus on the
legal underpinnings and possible constitutional pitfalls of juvenile
curfews, determining that such enactments may provide a constructive
alternative to traditional juvenile justice policy." In conclusion, this
Article suggests that the current juvenile crime problem calls for the
infusion of humanistic and community-based policies and programs
into Illinois' juvenile justice system. As the system exists today, this
Article laments, the goal of drastically reducing juvenile crime in
Illinois may remain just a benevolent ambition.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES
The American juvenile court system was created at the turn of the
century.16 Distinct notions of juvenile justice arose, in part, out of a
series of cases including and following the United States Supreme
Court's seminal decision in In re Gault.17 The philosophy behind
juvenile justice policy after In re Gault recognized the many differences
that exist between criminal acts committed by delinquent children and
those committed by adults. 8 The developing juvenile court system
thus focused on crime prevention and measures designed to steer
young offenders away from a destructive lifestyle of habitual, criminal
activity. 19
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Parts V.A-B.
16. See Marianne McConnell, Mediation-An Alternative Approach for the New
Jersey Justice System?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 436 (1996); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967).
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court held that juveniles are entitled to written notice of
charges, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to transcripts of proceedings, and the
right to appellate review. Id. at 2-3. The juvenile justice system originated in Cook
County, Illinois in 1899, focusing on preventative measures and attempting to keep the
child out of the criminal justice system after arrest. Id. at 14-15.
18. See McConnell, supra note 16, at 436.
19. See id. at 436 n. 15.
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Prior to In re Gault and the courts' increased sensitivity to children's
rights, children and adults were tried and sentenced in the same
criminal courts.20 Unlike adult offenders, however, children did not
receive the same liberties in criminal courts because juvenile offenses
were considered civil in nature. 21 As a result, juvenile offenders
received neither the protections afforded adults "nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children."22
Following the Court's decision in In re Gault, several cases
expanded the procedural protections available for child offenders.23
Three viewpoints encompass the ideas that have helped to shape
juvenile justice policy.24 The first viewpoint, the "criminal approach,"
is based on the belief that an individual's criminal conduct is within
their control and thus should be punished by society.25 In effect, as
autonomous beings, criminal defendants are ultimately responsible for
their deviant conduct. The second viewpoint, the "welfare approach,"
advances the position that criminal offenders are but symptoms of
more fundamental and pervasive societal ills.26 For crime to abate, this
theory postulates, underlying societal defects must first be remedied.
The last viewpoint, the "community approach," extends from the
"labeling theory" or the proposition that individuals selected by the
justice system can be, by virtue of their experiences within the system,
effectively transformed into criminals.27 Proponents of this theory
20. See id. at 439; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14. In Gault, Gerald Gault, age
fifteen, had been taken into custody for allegedly making lewd remarks to a neighbor by
telephone. Id. at 4. When Gerald was taken into custody, his parents did not receive
notice from the police. Id. at 5. Gerald and his family were also never advised of the
charges against him or of his right to an attorney. Id. at 10. The accusing party was not
present at the hearing and was thus not available for cross examination. Id. at 5. When
Gerald was ruled a juvenile delinquent, the decision was unappealable because juvenile
appeals were not then permitted in Arizona. Id. at 8. Furthermore, as no record was made
of the proceedings, no transcripts were available in the event of future action. Id. at 10.
21. See McConnell, supra note 16, at 439 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 10).
22. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1996) (finding a juvenile court order
which waived jurisdiction of a minor not in compliance with the Juvenile Court Act).
23. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (extending the protection against
double jeopardy to children); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that
juveniles are entitled to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof for offenses
which would be considered criminal if committed by an adult).
24. See McConnell, supra note 16, at 437 n.18 (citing PHYLLIDA PARSOLE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1978)).
25. Id. (citing PHYLLIDA PARSOLE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
9 (1978)) (noting that the "unpleasantness of a fine or imprisonment becomes a method
of motivating a change to more acceptable behavior").
26. Id. (citing PHYLLIDA PARSOLE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
10 (1978)) (noting that the "welfare approach" is very protective of the offender).
27. Id. at 437 n.18 (citing PHYLLIDA PARSOLE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE
[Vol. 28
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argue that juvenile court stigmatizes children "who have been elected
as deviants," thus fostering in young offenders a predisposition to
commit new crimes in the future.
28
III. TEEN COURT
One community-based alternative to traditional juvenile court
recently implemented in many Illinois communities is "teen court." 29
Teen court programs are based on similar programs implemented
throughout the nation.30 These programs have been initiated in twenty-
five states. 31 Typically, in such a program, a juvenile defendant who
has previously plead guilty, nolo contendre, or "responsible" appears
before a jury of his or her peers for sentencing.32 While individual
programs differ, often the only adult participants are a volunteer
attorney acting as judge and a juvenile officer acting as bailiff.
Teenagers assume the role of other court personnel as well as jurors.33
After the admitted offense is read, a teen jury will typically listen to
testimony regarding the offense and return with a recommended
UNITED STATES 18 (1978)).
28. Id. (citing PHYLLIDA PARSOLE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
18 (1978)) (stating that "[tihe typical juvenile court proceeding 'serves the purpose of a
degradation ceremony'").
29. Programs exist in many communities in Illinois, such as Round Lake and
Hoffman Estates. See Joan Giangrasse Kates, Administrator Is Sought for Teen Court,
CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1995, § 2, at 3; Julie Schwarzbach, Round Lake Area Teen Court
Program Proposal, at 9 (May 10, 1995).
30. See, e.g., David J. Chaffee, Teen Court: Empowering Teens to Judge Teens, 22
COLO. LAW., Nov. 12, 1993, at 2521 (discussing a teen court program in Denver,
Colorado). The teen court program in Denver, sponsored by the Denver Bar
Association, is based on the successful teen court model in Odessa, Texas. Id.
3 1. ABA statistics report that there are presently 246 teen courts, youth courts,
student courts, and peer court programs in 25 states, including: Alaska (2), Arkansas
(I), Arizona (16), California (21), Colorado (12), Florida (25), Georgia (1), Hawaii (I),
Iowa (3), Idaho (4), Illinois (3) (ABA statistics fail to report all programs presently
operating in Illinois), Indiana (10), Kansas (1), Kentucky (5), Louisiana (4),
Massachusetts (1), Michigan (3), Missouri (9), North Carolina (7), Nebraska (I), New
Mexico (19), Nevada (2), New York (18), Ohio (2), Oklahoma (5), Oregon (6),
Pennsylvania (4), South Carolina (1), South Dakota (I), Texas (51), Utah (6), and
Vermont (1). SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON YOUTH EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP, ABA, TEEN
COURT, STUDENT COURT, YOUTH COURT, AND PEER JURY PACKET (Aug. 9, 1995).
32. See Frederic B. Rodgers, How to Create and Conduct a Teen Court Program, 34
JUDGES' J., No. 3, at 16, 18 (1995) (discussing how young teen court defendants learn
about their responsibilities to the community and become accountable to their schools,
neighborhoods, and their peers).
33. In some programs, teens will assume the role of prosecuting attorney, defense
attorney, and in some limited instances, judge(s). Tracy Godwin, Teen Courts:
Empowering Youth in Community Prevention and Intervention Efforts, PERSPECTIVES,
Winter, 1996, at 20.
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sentence for the minor offender.3 4 Teen court programs instituted in
various jurisdictions in both Illinois and throughout the United States
report successful results." Further, the American Bar Association
House of Delegates, by Resolution, has recommended adoption of
such programs. 36
The philosophy underlying the teen court program is that teenagers
are less likely to run afoul of the law if they are involved in a judicial
proceeding that exerts positive peer pressure in an educational
setting.37 Further, offending teens are less likely to become involved
in illegal activity after participating in a judicial process in which their
peers determine the sentence.38 Lastly, proponents of teen court
emphasize, these programs are aimed at promoting feelings of self-
esteem, motivation for self-improvement, constructive attitudes toward
authority, and responsibilities of citizenship-all feelings which
discourage future criminal and self-destructive behavior.39
A. Statutory Basis of Program
While Illinois does not have a statute specifically authorizing the
teen court program, some have asserted that Illinois' Juvenile Code
implicitly sanctions such a program.40 Whether characterized as a
34. For a discussion of common teen court sentencing procedures, see Rodgers, supra
note 32 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.E.
35. See Chris Patterson, Bay County Bar Forwards Teen Court as Juvenile Sanction
Alternative, 69 FLA. B.J. 95 (1995) (discussing the serious problems posed by repeat
juvenile offenders in a local Florida judicial circuit and the "positive" and "dramatic"
results realized through the Bay County teen court program).
36. The Recommendation adopted by the ABA House of Delegates reads:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association encourages state and
territorial legislatures, court systems and bar associations to support and
assist in the formation and expansion of diversionary programs, known as
Youth Courts, where juvenile participants, under supervision of volunteer
attorneys and advisory staff, act as judges, jurors, clerks, bailiffs, and counsel
for first time juvenile offenders who are charged with misdemeanors and
consent to the program.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON YOUTH EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP, ABA, TEEN COURT, STUDENT
COURT, YOUTH COURT, AND PEER JURY PACKET (Aug. 9, 1995).
37. See Godwin, supra note 33, at 20 (listing the objectives of teen court).
38. See Rodgers, supra note 32, at 18 (noting that teen jurors learn about "the
importance of devising a fair, constructive sentence" and about applying the principals
of deterrence, rehabilitation, victim restitution, and punishment).
39. See Moran, supra note 4, at 7 (stating the objective of the juvenile justice
system: "To stop illegal conduct, bring behavior into conformity with the law, and
advance generally accepted moral principles").
40. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(15) (West Supp. 1996), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-6 (West 1993). While Illinois does not have a statute expressly authorizing a
teen court type program, some jurisdictions, such as Texas, do have such a statute. See,
724 [Vol. 28
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"station adjustment," "community service," or "other appropriate
action," the Code seemingly sanctions the operation of the teen court
program. For example, the Illinois Juvenile Code defines a "station
adjustment" as an "informal handling of an alleged offender by a
juvenile police officer."4 ' This definition, in connection with chapter
705, section 405/5-6 of the Illinois Code may allow for the teen court
program. Section 405/5-6 provides in relevant part:
(3) The juvenile police officer may take one of the following
actions:
(a) station adjustment with release of the minor;
(b) station adjustment with release of the minor to a parent;
(c) station adjustment, release of the minor to a parent, and
referral of the case to community services;
(d) station adjustment, release of the minor to a parent, and
referral of the case to community services with informal
monitoring by a juvenile police officer;
(e) station adjustment and release of the minor to a third
person pursuant to agreement of the minor and parents;
(f) station adjustment, release of the minor to a third person
pursuant to agreement of the minor and parents, and referral of
the case to community services;
(g) station adjustment, release of the minor to a third person
pursuant to agreement of the minor and parent, and referral to
community services with informal monitoring by a juvenile
police officer;
(h) release of the minor to his or her parents and referral of
the case to a county juvenile probation officer or such other
public officer designated by the court;
e.g., TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 45.55 (West Supp. 1997). The Texas statute provides
in pertinent part:
(a) A justice or municipal court may defer proceedings against a defendant who
is under the age of 18 or enrolled full time in an accredited secondary school
in a program leading toward a high school diploma for 90 days if the
defendant:
(1) is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by fine only or a violation of a
penal ordinance of a political subdivision, including a traffic offense
punishable by fine only;
(2) pleads nolo contendre or guilty to the offense in open court with the
defendant's parent, guardian, or managing conservator present;
(3) presents to the court an oral or written request to attend a teen court
program; and
(4) has not successfully completed a teen court program in the two years
preceding the date that the alleged offense occurred.
Id.
41. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3(15) (West 1993).
1997] 725
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(k) any other appropriate action with consent of the minor
and a parent.42
A teen court program is likely permitted under the aegis of the above
statutory sections, given the broad language.
B. Benefits of Program
Promoters of the teen court initiative assert that such programs
accomplish numerous goals for both the minor offender and the teen
volunteers.43 First, the programs encourage a sense of responsibility
and awareness of the consequences of criminal behavior. 4 Second,
by virtue of its nature as a legal proceeding operated solely by and for
teens, teen court imparts a positive attitude and respect for law and
authority. 45 Third, it familiarizes teens with the positive aspects of the
legal justice system.' Fourth, teen court educates as well as provides
an opportunity for juvenile offenders to develop and sharpen
interpersonal and communication skills required of productive
members of society. 47 Fifth, the availability of teen court reduces the
caseload in courts handling minor violations.48 Sixth, teen court
42. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-6 (West 1993).
43. See Moran, supra note 4, at 7. Judge Moran discusses how "peer pressure" can be
an effective deterrent to crime. Id. When used as a positive force "'peer pressure' can
assist parents, law enforcement, and the courts in preventing criminal behavior, and aid
in rehabilitating those youths who have committed criminal acts." Id. For the benefits
of "peer pressure" to be realized, however, "juveniles must be brought into the juvenile
justice system in capacities other than perpetrators and defendants." Id. See also
Rodgers, supra note 32, at 17-18.
44. See Chaffee, supra note 30, at 2522 (illustrating the positive effects of teen court
through the story of Shawna Mattison). Shawna Mattison performed every role in the
teen court program and states that the program inspired her to pursue a career in the law.
Id.
45. See Moran, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the need for a more community
inclusive juvenile justice system). As Moran notes:
In our present juvenile justice system, laws are made by adults, enforced and
adjudicated by adults, and punishments are inflicted by adults. Unfortunately,
the system does not reflect that everyone, including juveniles, has a
responsibility to control crime, and a direct duty to assert and impress on
fellow citizens, regardless of age, the necessity of obeying the law.
Id. Bearing this in mind, positive peer pressure must be employed by the juvenile
justice system to convey to today's youths the message that criminal activity is as
offensive to young people as it is to adults. Id.
46. Carol Jones, Routes for Youth, Santa Rosa, California-Teen Court Evaluation of
1994 Activities and Goals: Characteristics, Backgrounds and Outcomes of Program
Referrals at 3 (June 1995). See also Schwarzbach, supra note 29, at !.
47. See Godwin, supra note 33, at 20.
48. Stacey Colino, Welcome to Teen Court, CAL. LAWYER, February, 1991, at 34.
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provides exposure to the realities and consequences of the judicial
system.49 Finally, teen court allows teens to evaluate the proper
punishment for an offense.
Nationally, many teen court programs report low recidivism rates.
For example, in Odessa, Texas where the traditional juvenile justice
program reports a recidivism rate of 30% to 50%, the teen court
program reports a recidivism rate of less than 5%.50 In Hoffman
Estates, Illinois, the local police department reports that in 1993, 95%
of juveniles involved in the program did not become repeat
offenders. 51 Also from 1993, Gila County, Arizona, reports a
recidivism rate of less than 12%, and Montgomery, Indiana, reports a
recidivism rate between 10% and 15%.52 Lastly, Anchorage, Alaska
and Denver, Colorado, report rates of less than 4% and 15%,
respectively. 3 While the reader is cautioned that such programs
diversely define "recidivism,"' these results are certainly encouraging.
Teen court programs have also earned an impressive record in
disposing of cases. In Odessa, Texas, a chosen peer jury will hear
between 15 and 20 cases on a given night. In fact, since the Odessa
program's inception, 8,000 teens have been referred and over 80,000
hours of community service have been performed. 6 Similarly, the
teen court program in Saginaw, Michigan reports docketing between
300 to 400 teen court cases per year.57 In general, several court
systems have acknowledged that their teen court programs alleviate
some of the unmanageable pressure burdening the juvenile courts.5 8
49. ABA Special Committee on Youth Education for Citizenship, Teen Courts: What
They Are and What They Do, 13 LRE REP. 5 (winter 1992) [hereinafter LRE REP.].
50. More Teens Now Judged by Peers, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1994, at 22.
5 1. See Schwarzbach, supra note 29, at 9.
52. Deborah Williamson et al., Teen Court: Juvenile Justice for the 21st Century?,
57 FED. PROBATION, June 1993, at 54.
5 3. See LRE REP., supra note 49, at 5.
54. See Schwarzbach, supra note 29, at 9; Godwin, supra note 33, at 20-21.
55. Letter from Tammy Hawkins, court coordinator of Odessa, Texas, to the author
(on file with the author). In the letter, Tammy Hawkins writes in part:
Odessa Teen Court, Inc., defines success for the program by the low recidivism
rate-which is between 2%-5%. Measuring success of the program's
contribution to the community constitutes the youth themselves. These youth
have learned that when laws are broken, punishment is a consequence. But
even with punishment in the form of hours to serve and jury duties to perform,
the youth has contributed to his/her community.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Mary Church, Teen Juries Levy Pertinent Penalties on Their Peers, SAGINAW
NEWS, Nov. 10, 1991, at 2C.
58. See Colino, supra note 48, at 34.
1997] 727
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C. Eligibility
Typically, teen court programs allow offenders from 10 to 18 years
old to participate,5 9 although some programs will process children as
young as 7 and as old as 19.60 Often, the decision to refer a case will
be made by the charging authority, such as a police department,
sheriff's office, school authority, or juvenile court.6' As stated, these
minors will have already admitted guilt in some form.62 Further,
eligible offenders ordinarily need to have parental consent, and
typically, a participant cannot be a repeat offender.63
The flexibility of teen court programs is evidenced by the wide
variety of offenses that many of them have addressed.6 a In one
program, for example, eligible offenses include vandalism, trespass,
burglary, petty theft, assault, arson, dangerous weapons, theft, drug
violations, disturbing the peace, and stolen property.65 Other
programs address school misconduct 66 and minor felonies. 67 In
addressing a broad spectrum of juvenile offenses, teen court programs
aim to chill delinquent conduct at its earliest stage.
D. Schedule of Proceedings
Ordinarily, to initiate teen court proceedings, a minor who has
admitted guilt is referred by a police department, sheriff's office,
68school district, or juvenile court. While each program has uniqueprocedures, many of the programs contain common elements.
59. See Chaffee, supra note 30, at 2522 (noting that all of the participants of the
Denver teen court program are recruited from the Denver public schools from the eighth
through twelfth grades).
60. See Godwin, supra note 33, at 22.
61. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 32, at 20 (discussing how various law enforcement
agencies refer youthful offenders to teen court programs). "Officers who wish to refer a
case to Teen Court annotate summons and complaint forms with a request that Teen Court
be considered by the assistant district attorney reviewing the case." Id.
62. See supra text accompanying note 32.
63. Carol Jones, Teen Court, Evaluation of 1994 Activities and Goals/Routes for
Youth, Santa Rosa, California, (June 1995). Some teen court programs even allow
repeat offenders to participate. Id.
64. See, e.g., Chaffee, supra note 30, at 2521 (noting that most teen court cases
involve shoplifting and fighting). Only offenses which are considered violations
against the municipal code are heard in the Denver teen court program. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Peer Pressure Puts Teens on the Right Track, JUDICIAL FORUM (Florida),
August 1990, at 4.
67. Id. See also LRE REP., supra note 49, at 5 (noting that the teens referred to the
program have been cited or arrested for such offenses as minor misdemeanors, traffic
violations, serious violations of school policy, and minor felonies).
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
728 [Vol. 28
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Typically, the proceedings begin when the peer jury is sworn-in, the
attorneys are introduced, and the judge reads the charge. 69 Next, the
prosecution and the defense each deliver an opening statement,
followed by the direct and cross-examination of witnesses.7 °
Thereafter, the peer jury is given instructions on the proceedings and
the minor offender takes the witness stand to be questioned by
members of the jury.7' In Crawford County, peer jurors are provided
a list of suggested questions.72 After concluding testimony, a final
instruction is given by the judge, and lastly, a recommended sentence
is issued by the jury."
Some programs have adopted rather unconventional procedures. In
Saginaw County, Michigan, for example, a peer jury is allowed to
question parents in attendance.74 In Crawford County, Michigan, a
peer jury is allowed to question the minor offender both in and out of
the presence of the offender's attending parents.75
E. Sentence
Peer juries commonly issue traditional punishments, including
future participation as a teen court juror, financial restitution,
counseling, in-house detention, and community service.76 Many teen
court juries also creatively tailor the sentence to the circumstances of
the offending minor. For example, peer juries often require the minor
offender to write a letter of apology or an extensive essay concerning
the offense.77 In one case, where a peer jury found that a parent failed
69. See JUDICIAL FORUM, supra note 66, at 4.
70. Id.
7 1. See John Hunter, The Teen Jury Program in the Crawford County Probate Court,
COLLEAGUE, Oct. 1990, at 12.
72. Id. at 10. See also Rodgers, supra note 32, at 42 (discussing the typical forms of
evidence and the procedures for introduction of evidence in teen court trials). Evidence is
ordinarily in the form of oral testimony and written statements. Id. Defense may submit
two letters of support and prosecution may submit a victim statement or letter from a
school official. Id. Live witnesses who voluntarily agree to attend the hearing may be
called to testify under oath, but no witnesses will be compelled to testify or attend Teen
Court proceedings. Id.
73. See Hunter, supra note 71, at 10 (discussing the proceedings in Crawford County
teen court).
74. See Church, supra note 57, at 2C.
75. See Hunter, supra note 71, at 11. For a discussion of the forms, agreements,
consents, worksheets, sentence limits, descriptions of duties of prosecutor and defender,
scripts, verdict forms, referrals, subpoenas, and orders used in the Westminster teen
court in Colorado, see Rodgers, supra note 32, at 42. For an example of transcripts of
proceedings from the Westminster teen court, see Rodgers, supra note 32, at 43.
76. See LRE REP., supra note 49, at 5.
77. See Church, supra note 57, at 2C.
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to spend sufficient time with the offender, the parent was required to
spend at least one hour a day with the minor offender.7 8 Several of the
programs are thus quite sophisticated in their approach to sentencing.
In many instances, the jurors work off of predetermined sentencing
guidelines.
Compliance with the sentence is normally monitored by a teen court
coordinator. Ordinarily, if the teen completes the program, he or she
will not acquire a permanent record.7 9 However, in many
jurisdictions, if the teen fails to comply with the sentence, the matter
will be transferred to the regular court system. Some teen court
programs, prior to proceedings, warn the charged offender against
retribution toward peer jurors. In Crawford County, for example, the
teen court program addresses the jurors' concern of offender
retribution by warning the offender that any such retribution would be
immediately referred to the local prosecuting authority for a potential
criminal investigation. 8°
IV. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY ORDINANCES
Another response to the rise in juvenile crime is parental
responsibility ordinances.8 ' In general, these ordinances punish
parents for the misdeeds of their children.82 Illinois communities are
included among the several municipalities which have enacted forms of
these laws.83
78. See Hunter, supra note 71, at 12.
79. See Colino, supra note 48, at 34.
80. See Hunter, supra note 71, at 11.
81. See Kate Griffin, Towns Looking at Parental Responsibility, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27,
1994, § 2, at 7. Parental responsibility ordinances have been enacted in Arlington
Heights, Mt. Prospect, Glencoe, Wilmette, and other communities in Illinois. Id. In
addition, in June, 1994, a model parental responsibility ordinance was drafted by the
Northwest Municipal Conference, an association of 35 municipalities and townships.
Id. The ordinance holds parents responsible for the actions of minors who drink in the
parents' home or cars, even if the parents are not present. See Christi Parsons & Andrew
Martin, Party's Over, Even for Parents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1994, at I.
82. Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996
W is. L. REV. 399, 401 (1996). See generally Michelle L. Casgrain, Parental
Responsibility Laws: Cure for Crime or Exercise in Futility?, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 161
(1990); Howard Davidson, No Consequences-Re-examining Parental Responsibility
Laws, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1995-96); Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of
Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 303 (1991); Kathryn J. Parsley, Constitutional Limitations on
State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of their Children,
VAND. L. REV. 441 (1991).
83. See Griffin, supra note 81, at 7.
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Although these ordinances generally penalize a parent for knowing
or willful participation in the child's infraction, some Illinois
municipalities have recently passed ordinances that vicariously impose
criminal liability where the parent has minimal or no knowledge of the
minor's actions.8 4 In light of increased juvenile crime, it is
understandable that policymakers have turned to parents to guard
against delinquency. 85  However, the nature of some of these
enactments leave them vulnerable to legal challenge. 6
A. Background
Parental responsibility laws have been in existence since the early
1900s. 8' Although all fifty states have laws that impose civil fines on
parents for juvenile misdeeds, only Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Wyoming currently impose criminal
sanctions on parents who fail to control or supervise their childrens'
behavior.8 8 In Illinois, however, some communities have enacted
local parental responsibility ordinances.89 One stated purpose is "to
oblige parents to control their children to prevent intentional harm to
others." 90
In the past several years, local authorities have enacted ordinances
designed to motivate parents to exercise greater control over the
activities of their children. 9' Recent local ordinances not only impose
liability on parents for their "knowing" and "willful" participation in a
particular misdeed, but also impose liability for less culpable mental
states.92 These laws are an understandable response to recent surges
84. See, e.g., AURORA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-1 (1996).
85. See Karl Zinsmeister, Parental Responsibility and the Future of the American
Family, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1005, 1009 (1992) (advocating the passing and
enforcement of laws giving parents greater accountability for the actions of their minor
children).
86. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
87. See Irving A. Gladstone, The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Juvenile
Delinquency in New York State: A Developmental History, 21 BROOK. L. REV. 172, 173
(1955).
88. Michael Dizon, Parental Criminal Liability Plans Walk a Fine Line, CHI. TRIB.,
June 19, 1996, at 1. In Illinois, state legislators have recently pushed for the enactment
of a state law making parents criminally liable for a broad spectrum of crimes committed
by their children. Id.
89. See, e.g., PALATINE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. XVIII, §§ 12-268 to
12-271 (1996); MOUNT PROSPECT, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23.601 (1996).
90. Robison v. First State Bank, 495 N.E.2d 637, 639 (III. App. 3d Dist. 1986).
9 1. See, e.g., Should Good Parents Be Jailed When Bad Children Break Laws, JET,
June 27, 1994, vol. 86 (num. 8), at 14; John Leo, Punished for the Sins of the Children,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 12, 1995, vol. 118 (num. 23), at 18.
92. See PALATINE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. XVIII, § 12-268 (1996);
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in juvenile crime.93 However, the inherently attenuated nature of
vicarious liability leaves them susceptible to legal challenge.
Commentators have suggested various legal challenges to parental
responsibility laws. 94  These challenges include issues of
overbreadth, 95 Eighth Amendment protections (against cruel and
unusual punishment),96 equal protection," vicarious criminal
liability,98 vagueness, 99 and substantive due process." The following
sections will consider the latter two challenges to recent ordinances-
vagueness and substantive due process.' '
B. Vagueness
One challenge to parental responsibility ordinances is the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine.' °2 This doctrine mandates that a criminal law
must be struck down as void if it is so vague that "'men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."",10 3 A vagueness challenge is grounded in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 0 4 The
purpose of this doctrine is, inter alia, to prevent the arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of unclear laws.'0 5
AURORA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-27 (1996).
93. Interestingly, very few parents have been charged under these laws, leading some
to speculate that the laws are intended to be educational rather than punitive. Parsons &
Martin, supra note 81, at 1.
94. See, e.g., S. Randall Humm, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to
Contain Violence By and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1138 (1991)
(quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); Parsley, supra
note 82, at 448-59.
95. See Catherine Clements, Williams v. Garcetti: The Constitutionality of Holding
Parents Criminally Liable for the Acts of Their Children, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
417, 431-33 (1995).
96. See Penelope D. Clute, "Parental Responsibility" Ordinances-Is Criminalizing
Parents When Children Commit Unlawful Acts a Solution to Juvenile Delinquency?, 19
WAYNE L. REV. 1551, 1566-67 (1973).
97. Id. at 1567-68.
98. See Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of
Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 859, 863-66 (1991).
99. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 448-59.
100. Id. at 459-71.
101. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C.
102. See Cahn, supra note 82, at 412-13.
103. Humm, supra note 94, at 1138 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
104. Id.
105. See Cahn, supra note 82, at 412.
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In Grayned v. City of Rockford,'06 the Supreme Court noted that
vague laws are offensive for several reasons. 0 7 First, such laws fail
to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
conform their behavior.'08 Second, vague laws, by failing to express
explicit standards, are subject to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.' 0 9  Third, such laws tend to inhibit protected
freedoms. 0
Illinois courts have examined the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine as
well.' In Illinois, courts have held that to be unconstitutionally
vague, a statute must be so indefinite, and so ill-defined, that people
must guess at its meaning." 2 For example, Illinois' Second Appellate
District has held that "a statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face
only if it provides no standard of conduct at all, meaning that the
ambiguity is so pervasive that the statute is incapable of any valid
application."" 
3
The ill-defined nature of some recent parental responsibility
ordinances leaves them susceptible to a vagueness challenge." 4 For
example, an ordinance recently enacted in Palatine, Illinois, seeks to
broaden the net of parental liability by diminishing the quantum of
knowledge necessary to impose liability." 5 Under the Palatine
ordinance, the term "knowingly" is defined as "[h]aving general
knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief
which warrants further inquiry or inspection."'' 6 The Palatine
106. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
107. Id. at 108.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 108-09.
110. Id. at 109. The Grayned court noted that "[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead
citizens 'to steer for wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden were clearly marked." Id. (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372
(1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))).
1 11. See, e.g., People v. Blackorby, 586 N.E.2d 1231, 1239 (II1. 1992); People v.
R.G., 546 N.E.2d 533, 549 (111. 1989).
112. See Blackorby, 586 N.E.2d at 1233; see also R.G., 546 N.E.2d at 549
(recognizing that "[a] legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague if its terms are
so indefinite that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and application").
113. People v. Sonntag, 605 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1992).
114. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
115. PALATINE, ILL, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. XVIII, § 12-268(2) (1996)
(defining knowingly as "a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inquiry or
inspection.").
1 16. Id. For an identical definition of "knowingly" see MOUNT PROSPECT, ILL, CODE
OF ORDINANCES art. IV., § 23-601 (1996). See also People v. Herr, 409 N.E.2d 442 (II1.
App. 2d Dist. 1980) (holding that a person acts knowingly "when he is consciously
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ordinance further broadens parental liability by declaring it to be
unlawful for a parent "to knowingly or negligently act, or fail to act, in
such a manner as to facilitate or contribute to any violation or attempted
violation of any state law or municipal ordinance by said minor.' 7
Under this ordinance, a parent may be held liable for unknowingly
failing to act. The questionable ability of such nebulous standards to
apprise parents of their legal obligations," 8 however, makes the
ordinances exceedingly vulnerable to a vagueness challenge." 9
Ordinances such as Palatine's may be vulnerable to a vagueness
objection for failing to guide parents as to their legal obligation. The
Palatine ordinance's requirement that parents act where they have
"knowledge ... which warrants further inquiry" may be challenged
on the basis that such a standard does not unambiguously convey
when a parental obligation is triggered.1 20  Rather, the expressed
aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result"). See also 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (defining knowledge as when the
actor is consciously aware that his conduct is of such a nature as to meet the
circumstances defined in the offense).
117. PALATINE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. XVIII, § 12-269. Section 12-
269 provides in full:
It shall be unlawful for any parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor
residing with said parent or legal guardian to knowingly allow or to
knowingly permit said minor to violate or attempt to violate any state law or
municipal ordinance or to knowingly or negligently act, or fail to act, in such
a manner as to facilitate or contribute to any violation or attempted violation
of any state law or municipal ordinance by said minor.
Id.
118. Id. Section 12-270 of the Palatine Ordinance outlines the liability of a parent or
legal guardian of a minor offender:
Subject to the conditions contained in 12-269 the parent or legal guardian of
an unemancipated minor who has custody of such minor shall be jointly and
severally liable for any fine, condition or reparation imposed by a court, and
for full restitution to any injured or damaged party or parties for the willful or
malicious acts of said minor child provided that said amount shall not exceed
$1,000; provided however, that said parent or legal guardian has been served
with a summons or notice to appear and written notice setting forth the
charges against said minor child in the original cause as provided by law.
Id. at § 12-270.
119. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Akers, for example, struck down a
similar parental responsibility ordinance as unconstitutionally vague. 400 A.2d 38, 40
(N.H. 1979) (invalidating N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 269-C:24 IV (Supp. 1977)). The
statute provided that "parents . . . will be responsible . .. . for any violations of this
chapter by any person under the age of 18." Akers, 400 A.2d at 39. The court held that
this language violated due process because it failed to specifically identify acts which
would lead to criminal liability. Id. at 40. See also Cahn, supra note 82, at 412
(discussing Akers, 400 A.2d at 40).
120. See PALATINE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. XVIII, § 12-268. See also
supra note 102-10 (discussing the void for vagueness doctrine).
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standard requires the parent to guess what behavior compels further
inquiry. Potentially, then, parents may be held liable for their child's
actions when their knowledge is entirely attenuated from those actions.
In light of the United States Supreme Court and Illinois decisions
discussed above,' 2' the Palatine ordinance could very well fail if
challenged on vagueness grounds.
C. Substantive Due Process
An expansive parental responsibility ordinance also risks being
challenged as violative of the substantive due process provisions of the
United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. 22 This risk
exists because many of these ordinances, as written, may infringe
upon parents' fundamental right to raise their children. 23
Since Meyer v. Nebraska, 124 the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the paramount significance of parents' right to "establish a
home and bring up children."'12' Although somewhat amorphous, this
fundamental right has nonetheless been referenced in various Supreme
Court cases. 126 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,127 for example, the
Supreme Court recognized that parents "have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare [a child] for additional
obligations." '28 Additionally, in Prince v. Massachusetts,29 the Court
explained that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."' 0 Several years later, in Griswold v.
121. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
122. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 459. The author points out that while vagueness
challenges to parental liability statutes are more common, a substantive due process
challenge may be more likely to succeed. Id. The Illinois due process clause is located at
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
123. Id. See also Cahn, supra note 82, at 414-15 (stating that parental liability
statutes may "offend substantive due process because they impinge on a fundamental
right . . . the parent-child relationship").
124. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
125. Id. at 399.
126. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has rarely
directly addressed the parental right to raise children. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 462.
However, the Court "has continued to recognize the fundamental nature of parental rights
in a variety of other situations." Id.
127. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
128. Id. at 535.
129. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
130. Id. at 166.
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Connecticut,3' the Supreme Court affirmed Meyer and Pierce,132 and,
in Stanley v. Illinois, 33 the Court stated that "[t]he integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
34
More recently, in Bellotti v. Baird,135 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its commitment to parental rights and declared that "deeply rooted in
our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role
implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children.' 36
Later, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,137 the Court made
plain that parental rights deserve deference "absent a powerful
countervailing interest. '138 In short, the Supreme Court has clearly
and consistently recognized the fundamental nature of parental
rights. "9
Given that the parental right is a fundamental right,' 40 in order to
pass constitutional muster a parental responsibility municipal ordinance
must satisfy a two-step analysis. 4 ' The first part requires that the
statute further a compelling state interest. 42 The second part mandates
that the ordinance be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling
interest. 43  Applying this analysis, an expansive parental
responsibility ordinance most likely will satisfy the first
consideration.' 44 However, there is some question as to whether the
131. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
132. Id. at 483.
133. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
134. Id. at 651.
135. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
136. Id. at 638.
137. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
1 38. Id. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
139. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 462-63.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 124-39.
141. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 459. Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (discussing a
state's goals and the means used to achieve them in the context of a fourteenth
amendment challenge to a state procedure terminating parental rights).
1 42. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 459. Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (stating that
"removing [a child] from the custody of his parents ...when his welfare or safety ...
cannot be adequately safeguarded" is a "legitimate interest[ I").
143. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 459. Cf. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (stating "we
are here not asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the state ends, rather, to determine
whether the means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally defensible").
144. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 465 (commenting that the "state's compelling
interest for [parental liability statutes] is the protection of society from the wrongful
acts of children").
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"means" are sufficiently tailored to the "ends" to survive the second
prong of the test. 1
45
By imposing vicarious liability on a parental guardian, a
municipality seeks to protect society from the wrongful and harmful
acts of children, as well as to protect the child who is inclined to
commit these acts.' 46 This dual interest is the basis for many, if not
all, such statutes. The Supreme Court, when considering a similar
interest, found it to be compelling. 47 In Parham v. J.R., 48 the Court
acknowledged that a state can constitutionally control parental
discretion in situations where the physical or mental health of a child is
jeopardized. 49 An ordinance designed to discourage minors from
undertaking illicit acts could thus be regarded as serving a compelling
state interest.
Although the protection of society and children is decidedly a
compelling interest, there is some debate as to whether vicarious
liability imposed upon parents is ever sufficiently tailored to meet its
intended goal. 5 ° Little information exists on the benefits of such
laws. Furthermore, several authorities reviewing this issue maintain
that such laws do not appreciably reduce juvenile crime."' For
example, a study conducted during the 1960s by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare indicates that the sixteen states that had
enacted civil parental responsibility laws had slightly higher crime rates
than those states without similar laws. 52
Other commentators also have argued that parental responsibility
laws do not appreciably curb juvenile delinquency. 5 3 For example, a
145. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 467-71.
146. See supra note 142.
147. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
148. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
149. Id. at 603; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228-29 (1972) (holding
that mandatory state school attendance laws would not be enforced on Amish teens where
the Amish tradition was to keep teens on the farm until age 16 and no evidence of health
endangerment was found).
150. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing the two step
analysis).
151 . See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
152. Alice B. Freer, Parental Liability for Torts of Children, 53 KY. L.J. 254, 264-65
(1964) (citing a 1963 study by the Juvenile Delinquency Studies Branch, Division of
Research, Children's Bureau, Welfare Administration, Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, on the effectiveness of parental civil liability laws). But see Town in
Wisconsin Debates Fining Parents of Delinquents, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1995, § 6 at 8.
In Silverton, Oregon, where parents may be prosecuted after their child has two
violations within a six-month period, reports a 53% drop in juvenile crime since the
parental responsibility laws enactment. Id.
153. See infra notes 154-56.
1997] 737
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 28
1948 study conducted by a Toledo, Ohio judge on the efficacy of
Toledo's parental responsibility ordinance asserts that punishing
parents has no effect on reducing juvenile delinquency. 54 Lastly,
many courts have even rejected the presumption that parental influence
is an overriding cause of juvenile misconduct.' Thus, the belief that
parental actions are directly responsible for juvenile delinquency, an
assertion upon which parental responsibility laws are based, has found
little support among courts and secondary authorities. 5 6
Various experts agree, however, that a number of factors contribute
to juvenile delinquency. 5' These factors include drug abuse, school
failure, inadequate family relationships, antisocial values, child abuse,
and association with delinquent peers. 5 8 In light of these factors,
many commentators have questioned whether parental responsibility
ordinances accomplish their intended goal.' 59 As such, these
ordinances may very well be struck down if faced with a substantive
due process challenge.
V. JUVENILE CURFEWS
In light of the long and extensive history of juvenile curfew
legislation, 60 it is paradoxical that curfew laws are discussed as a
1 54. See Parsley, supra note 82, at 467-68 (citing Judge Paul Alexander, What's This
About Punishing Parents?, 12 FED. PROBATION 23 (1948)). According to Parsley, Judge
Alexander reviewed 1027 cases, 500 of which involved parents as defendants. Id. at 467
n.217.
155. See, e.g., Doe v. Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200, 1203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976). In Doe, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a Trenton ordinance that fined
parents for juvenile misconduct failed to meet due process requirements. Id. at 1202-03.
Specifically, the Doe court rejected a statutory presumption that "parental influence is an
overriding cause of juvenile misconduct." Id. at 1203. See also Clute, supra note 96, at
1563 n.84 (citing to a state court's lament that even psychologists and sociologists
"cannot agree on the most effective methods of child rearing").
156. Although various authorities have rejected the notion that a child's crime is a
product of improper parenting, some Illinois communities have enacted ordinances
based on this presumption. For example, an Aurora, Illinois ordinance presumes that a
parent, absent evidence to the contrary, is guilty of improper parenting where an
unemancipated minor is adjudicated to be in violation of the law, the parent receives
notice of the violation and, within two (2) years, the minor commits another violation.
AURORA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 29-27 (1996). This infraction is a misdemeanor.
Id.
157. See, e.g., Parsley, supra note 82, at 468.
158. See Clute, supra note 96, at 1567 (noting that such laws may punish parents for
activity beyond their control); Parsley, supra note 82, at 468 (citing "social class,
educational level, urbanization, living conditions, and social instability" as factors in
addition to irresponsible parenting that contribute to delinquent behavior).
159. See, e.g., Parsley, supra note 82, at 467-71.
160. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 690-91 (Md. 1964)
(discussing the history of juvenile curfews). See also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 124-
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recent trend.' 6' People have generally considered curfews to be
effective weapons against crime. As a result, policymakers
throughout the nation are calling for more expansive laws to restrict
minors' activities after dark, 63 and, in many cases, they have enacted
new curfew laws. 164 These juvenile curfew laws, however, are not
free from legal challenges. 6
5
A. Recent Trends in Juvenile Curfew Statutes
Juvenile curfews serve a number of objectives. 66  First,
policymakers hope that curfews will save lives. 167 Police officers
recognize that curfews can reduce the pool of victims of crime.' 68 In
addition, curfews may reduce the pool of criminals on the streets. 69
25. Some cities have had curfews for close to one hundred years. Id. For instance,
Portland, Oregon passed its original juvenile curfew in 1906, and Honolulu has had its
since 1896. Id. at 126-27. A number of cities have enacted curfew laws in recent years.
In 1994 alone, cities like New Orleans, Miami, and Orlando, Florida, passed juvenile
curfews. Id. at 124-29.
16 1. See infra notes 167-85.
162. See generally T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the
Policy of Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885 (1996); Tona
Trollinger, The Juvenile Curfew: Unconstitutional Imprisonment, 4 WM. & MARY BULL.
RTS. J. 949 (1996).
163. See Trollinger, supra note 162, at 960-63 (recognizing the desire of politicians
to enact curfew statutes). Trollinger cites to one public official, for instance, who
testified that juveniles out after their curfew can become lookouts for drug pushers. Id. at
962 n.70.
164. See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to
Illinois' curfew law which makes it more rigorous).
165. See infra Part V.B.
166. Stated goals include: "(1) reduc[ing accident injuries] involving juveniles; (2)
reduc[ing] additional time for officers in the field; (3) provid[ing] additional options for
dealing with gang problems; (4) reduc[ing] juvenile peer pressure to stay out late; and (5)
assist[ing] parents in the control of their children." Qutb v. Strauss, II F.3d 488, 494
n.8 (5th Cir. 1993).
167. See Trollinger, supra note 162, at 961. One local official has stated that "[wle
don't know how many lives the curfew will save. But if it saves one, if it protects that
four year old, if it says to them, 'The streets [are] not the place for you,' then it's time
for a curfew." Id. at 960-61. Trollinger acknowledges the argument that "[i]f juveniles
are confined to their homes, they cannot commit or be victimized by crime-at least
public crime." Id. at 961.
168. Id.
169. Id. One policymaker testified, "I have personally observed the gangs and the
crack houses. I've seen the kids that should be at home asleep or studying out there
being lookout people for the drug pushers." Id. at 962-63 n.70 (citing Victor Inzunza,
Both Sides Rest in Suit Over Dallas Curfew, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, July 24,
1991, at B4).
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Most importantly, curfews can assist parents in imposing parental
responsibility.170
As a result of a curfew's impact, curfew laws are being strongly
encouraged and often enacted at the federal, state, and local level.' 71 A
1996 Justice Department survey found that 73% of the 200 largest
United States cities have enacted curfews in response to present
juvenile crime rates. 72 At the federal level, President Clinton has
praised curfews and suggested that communities impose curfews as
early as 8 p.m. 73 President Clinton's comments are consistent with
his promise in 1997 to concentrate on juveniles as both perpetrators
and victims.
Consistent with federal policy, Illinois and its communities have
sought to curtail juvenile delinquency through the passage of curfew
laws. 74 For example, Chicago, which has had various curfews since
1915, requires children under 17 to be indoors between 10:30 p.m.
and 6 a.m. on the weekdays, and 11:30 p.m. and 6 a.m. on the
weekends. 175 Chicago authorities report that over the past several
years, violations of the curfew laws have slowly decreased. 76
Specifically, Chicago Police noted 94,048 curfew violations in 1993,
83,063 in 1994 and 82,407 in 1995.17
In view of the success of these laws, Chicago council members
have proposed harsher penalties for curfew violations.' 78 For
example, council members have proposed that teenagers driving cars
after curfew have their vehicle impounded. 179 Under one such
170. Id. at 961. A former police chief stated: "Parents also need an ordinance.
Parents need to be reminded of their responsibility to control the behavior of their
kids." Id. at 959 n.64. Another observer stated that "[a]nyone that argues that it should
solely be the parents' responsibility to set curfews and keep their kids at home just does
not realize the extent to which parental authority has been eroded." Ann Melvin, City
Curfew is a Victory for Parents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 27, 1993, at 31A.
171. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. See also Trollinger, supra note
162, at 949-50 (observing the increasing use of curfew laws as a response to rising
crime rates).
172. William Neikirk & Charles M. Madigan, Curfew Crusade, Restrictions a Tool for
Police to Wield, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1996, at 20.
173. Id.
174. Id. See also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 124-29. Communities like Peoria
and Rockford also have curfews. Id. at 127-28.
175. Neikirk & Madigan, supra note 172, at 20.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Jacquelyn Heard, Curfew Proposal Delayed; 2 Alderman Object to Seizing
Vehicles, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 1996, at 3.
179. Jacquelyn Heard, Curfew Violators May Be Hit Where It Hurts: City Alderman
Want to Seize their Wheels, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1996, at 5.
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proposal, owners of an impounded vehicle would be responsible for
the curfew violation plus a $500 car-retrieval fine in addition to the
$105 city towing fee and the $10 per day storage cost. '80
Most importantly, Illinois recently toughened its curfew statute.1
81
The General Assembly amended the statute in late 1996, and it became
effective on January 1, 1997.182 The recent amendment subjects
parents and those "in control" to greater liability for curfew
infractions.18 3 Specifically, the amendment increases penalties against
parents who "knowingly permit a person" in their custody or control to
violate the state's curfew. 8 4  The amended statute now punishes
parents not just with increased fines, but also with community
service. "'
180. Id.
181. Pub. Act No. 89-682, § 10, 1996 I11. Legis. Serv. 3431-32 (West) (to be
codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 555/1(b) and (c)). The amendment changed sub-
parts (b) and (c). The statute now reads as follows:
(a) It is unlawful for a person less than 17 years of age to be present at or upon
any public assembly, building, place, street, or highway at the following
times unless accompanied and supervised by a parent, legal guardian, or
other responsible companion at least 18 years of age approved by a parent or
legal guardian or unless engaged in a business or occupation which the laws
of this State authorize a person less than 17 years of age to perform:
I. Between 12:01 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Saturday;
2. Between 12:01 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Sunday;
3. Between 11:00 p.m. on Sunday to Thursday, inclusive, and 6:00 a.m. on
the following day.
(b) It is unlawful for a parent, legal guardian, or other person to knowingly
permit a person in his or her custody or control to violate subparagraph (a)
of this Section.
(c) A person convicted of a violation of any provision of this Section shall be
guilty of a petty offense and shall be fined not less than $10 nor more than
$500, except that neither a person who has been made a ward of the court
under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, nor that person's legal guardian, shall
be subject to any fine. In addition to or instead of the fine imposed by this
Section, the court may order a parent, legal guardian, or other person
convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of this Section to perform
community service as determined by the court, except that the legal guardian
of a person who has been made a ward of the court under the Juvenile Court
Act of 1987 may not be ordered to perform community service. The dates and
times established for the performance of community service by the parent,
legal guardian, or other person convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of
this Section shall not conflict with the dates and times that the person is
employed in his or her regular occupation.
182. See id. (to be codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 555/1(b) and (c)).
183. Id. (to be codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 555/1(b) and (c)).
184. Id. (to be codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 555/1(b) and (c)).
185. See id. (to be codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 555/1(b) and (c)).
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B. Judicial Scrutiny of Juvenile Curfews
Illinois courts have sanctioned juvenile curfew laws for some
time. 1 6 In 1976, in People v. Chambers, 87 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the state curfew law was constitutional. 88 In
Chambers, two teenagers challenged their arrest under the state curfew
statute, arguing that the law unconstitutionally infringed on their rights
of assembly, association, speech, and freedom of travel. 89 Ruling
against the teens, the court first recognized that the state's traditional
power to protect children limits a juvenile's rights to assemble and
travel.'90 Moreover, the court acknowledged the state's legitimate
interest in reducing juvenile crime, which was rapidly increasing at the
time of the Chambers decision.' 9'
Despite Chambers, in recent years, courts in several other
jurisdictions have invalidated curfews on various constitutional
grounds.' 92 For example, in Hutchins v. District of Columbia,93 a
court in the District of Columbia held that a nighttime curfew failed to
withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.' 94 In Hutchins, the court first held
that minors have a fundamental right to travel and assemble freely.'95
186. See People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (Ii. 1976). See also Village of
Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (III. App. 2d Dist. 1990) (holding local curfew
ordinance constitutional).
187. 360 N.E.2d 55 (111. 1976).
188. Id. at 59.
189. Id. at 56. At the criminal trial, the two plaintiffs, both teenagers, had been
found guilty of violating the Illinois curfew and had been fined ten dollars. Id.
190. Id. at 57-58. Although the court stated that rights to assemble and to travel
freely have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, the Chambers court
recognized limitations placed on a juvenile, reasoning:
In legislating for the welfare of its children, the State is not required, in our
opinion, to proceed upon the assumption that minor children have an
absolutely unlimited right not only to choose their own associates, but also to
decide when and where they will associate. Recognition of such a right would
require a wholesale revision of the large body of law that related to guardian
and ward, parent and child, and minors generally.
Id.
191. Id. at 58. The Chambers court noted that juvenile crime had increased
dramatically during the 1970s and that the increase was not "wholly attributable" to the
post-World War II baby boom. Id.
192. It should be noted that the Chambers decision was not unanimous, and the
dissenting judge argued that the curfew was unconstitutional. Id. at 59 (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting). Justice Goldenhersh argued that the curfew was void for vagueness and too
subjective. Id. at 59-60 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
193. 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996).
194. Id. at 680.
195. Id. at 671-72. The court did state that some other jurisdictions do not recognize
a fundamental right for minors to freely travel. Id. at 671.
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Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, 196 the court ruled that the District of
Columbia did have a compelling interest in enacting the curfew. 97
However, the court then held that the curfew was not narrowly tailored
to the District's compelling interest.'98 The court, for example, noted
that the statistical evidence presented indicated that most juvenile crime
occurs in the afternoon and declines throughout the day. 99 Further,
the court observed that the curfew was unlikely to impact crime
because many crimes "occur at home, and involve family, friends, and
acquaintances. 200 Such statistical evidence may undercut Illinois'
curfew law.20'
The Iowa Supreme Court also recently struck down a local curfew
on constitutional grounds. In City of Maquoketa v. Russell, °2 the
Iowa Supreme Court struck down a local curfew ordinance that
imposed liability where the minor was outside during restricted hours,
unaccompanied by an adult and not taking a direct route between home
and employment, or between "home and a parentally approved
supervised activity. 20 3  The Iowa Supreme Court held that this
ordinance was over-broad and infringed upon protected freedoms.2l
The Maquoketa court noted that the enactment infringed upon protected
freedoms by preventing minors from attending late night church
services, political functions, and from other activities protected by the
First Amendment.0 5 In the next several years, it will be interesting to
see if a similar challenge is made to Illinois' curfew law and local
ordinances.
196. Id. at 674. The court stated that "[t]o withstand strict scrutiny, a law must be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored
to advance that interest." Id.
197. Id. at 674.
198. Id. at 674-80.
199. Id. at 676.
200. Id.
201. Other arguments may also undercut the Illinois curfew law. For instance, some
observers argue that the curfew is far from a "panacea" for crime. See Trollinger, supra
note 162, at 963. The observers have recognized that the most serious crimes are still
committed by adults. Id. at 965. Even the Illinois Supreme Court in Chambers conceded
the limited effectiveness of a curfew. See People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 59 (II1.
1976) (recognizing that "[t]he causes of the shocking increase in juvenile crime lie too
deep").
202. 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1992).
203. Id. at 180-81, 186.
204. Id. at 186.
205. Id. at 184-86.
1997]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
VI. CONCLUSION
Juvenile delinquency presents one of society's most urgent and
complex problems. Over the past several years, policymakers have
attempted to remedy juvenile delinquency through a number of
different programs and enactments. Those at the front line realize that
juvenile crime is best addressed at the family and community level.
Over the past several years, community response has taken the form of
teen court programs, parental responsibility laws and curfew laws.
In addition to the measures discussed above, communities are
experimenting with several other thoughtful programs to curtail recent
trends. In Cook County, a pilot Juvenile Court Drug Program has
been implemented with the help of a federal grant.206 This eighteen
month program is designed to monitor the success of an early
intervention program for minors who have been involved in substance
abuse and charged with a delinquent act. Underlying this pilot
program is the presumption that drug treatment and related sanctions
are most effective when initiated soon after the minor's arrest. It is the
hope of Cook County officials that by removing drugs from the
juvenile's environment, the dividend will be a reduction of other types
of delinquency.
In another program, DuPage County officials have teamed up with
Boy Scouts of America in an effort to divert juvenile offenders away
from the court system.2°7 This program seeks to redirect first-time,
nonviolent offenders and provide them with a positive alternative to the
court system. In addition to requiring community service, a minor
involved with the program may make field trips to the DuPage Court
Jail to speak with inmates. Also, minors may take field trips to the
county coroner's office. This is another creative, community-involved
program that could impact and rectify a juvenile's behavior.
Programs such as those discussed in this Article struggle with the
often arduous task of isolating those individualized actions and
environments that spawn delinquency. Programs relying on family
and community involvement are perhaps the most conducive to
providing an intensive atmosphere that nourishes and steers the
juvenile toward productive behavior. The creativity, energy, and
thoughtfulness underlying these programs virtually guarantee that
benefits will result.
206. See Judicial Advisory Council, Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Cook County Juvenile Court Drug Program.
207. Brendan M. Stephens, Boy Scouts Step to the Fore with Program to Keep
Suburban Youths Out of Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 21, 1996, at I.
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